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Are Agricultural Experiment Station
Faculty Salaries Competitively or
Monopsonistically Determined?
Christopher B. Barrett and DeeVon Bailey
We examine the determinants of agricultural experiment station faculty salaries and find that
productivity pays—as manifest by grantsmanship, publications, and the elicitation of
competing offers—with no residual evidence of a negative seniority-salary relationship that
could signal university monopsony power. This contrasts with findings in the previous
literature on faculty salaries. Moreover, national market salary benchmarks, which may proxy
for imperfectly observable productivity, correlate afmost one-for-one with individual faculty
salaries, with individual deviations from peers’ salaries proving essentially random. This
evidence is much more consistent with the hypothesis that experiment station faculty salaries
are determined in a competitive labor market than with the prevailing wisdom that they are set
monopsonistically.
Understanding the determinants of university fac-
ulty salaries is important both to academic career
planning and to possible legal and institutional is-
sues like discrimination, the incentive effects of the
tenure system, the political economy of higher edu-
cation funding, or the exercise of monopsony or
oligopsony power by universities that might
prompt faculty unionization. The recent labor eco-
nomics literature generally supports claims of non-
competitive labor markets, Indeed, Boal and Ran-
som (p. 99) claim in a recent survey that “[t]he case
for monopsony in labor markets seems almost
compelling.” Of particular relevance to this paper,
published empirical work on academic labor mar-
kets seems to reject competitive markets models,
suggesting that universities face upward-sloping
faculty labor supply curves and thereby exercise
monopsony power (Gordon et al., Hoffman, Ran-
som, Hallock). For example, Ransom interprets his
findings of negative marginal effects of faculty se-
niority on salary as evidence consistent with
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monopsonistic salary discrimination by universi-
ties, wherein individuals with high (unobservable)
moving costs receive lower salaries and accumu-
late greater seniority at a university than do indi-
viduals with low moving costs.
As the next section explains, we doubt the hy-
pothesis of university monopsony power for three
reasons. First, it contradicts a long standing labor
economics literature that cites seniority as contrib-
uting firm-specific human capital that enhances la-
bor productivity. Second, it implies high moving
costs that may be excessive. And third, the existing
empirical evidence fails to account satisfactorily
for either measurable faculty productivity or exog-
enous salary rates prevailing in the academic labor
market. We then present empirical evidence, for
university faculty with partial research appoint-
ments to an agricultural experiment station, that is
more consistent with the opposing hypothesis: that
academic labor markets are competitive. Like Bar-
bezat and Donihue’s recent findings, our empirical
results suggest that the marginal effect of seniority
is positive until a faculty member is quite ad-
vanced. Moreover, when we incorporate measures
of faculty productivity, and especially when we
control for a benchmark salary from the national
market, the statistical significance of demographic
characteristics like experience and seniority falls
precipitously. In our data, it seems that productiv-
ity pays and any relationship between faculty de-
mographics and salary are spurious relations attrib-
utable to omitted relevant variables bias.2 April 1999
There are four primary reasons to pursue this
issue. First, the suggestion that universities exer-
cise monopsonistic control over faculty colors the
tone of faculty-administration relations on cam-
puses and therefore demands careful scrutiny. The
appearance of monopsony power exerted by a uni-
versity over individual faculty members may elicit
calls for unionization to achieve bargaining power
and thus a potentially more efficient bilateral mo-
nopoly equilibrium. Faculty unionization is an ac-
tive topic on several major research university
campuses. Since the 1980 Supreme Court decision
in National Labor Relations Board vs. Yeshiva
University effectively denied collective bargaining
rights to faculty at private universities, the number
of unionized campuses has fallen. As of January
1997, faculty collective bargaining units or agree-
ments existed at only 309% of U.S. college and
university campuses (private and public), repre-
senting a similar proportion of full-time faculty in
the country (NCCSCBHEP 1997). The debate over
competition or monopsony in the academic labor
market speaks directly to this topic. The results we
present come from a nonunionized campus. Sec-
ond, the institution of tenure is being carefully
scrutinized by many institutions, perhaps espe-
cially in public universities, including the land
grant system, because of popular perception that
salary and job security are unrelated to faculty pro-
ductivity. The regression specifications employed
in some recent studies (e.g., Ransom, Hallock, Bar-
bezat and Donihue) may feed such perceptions by
paying relatively little attention to the relationship
between faculty salaries and productivity, We feel
the issue deserves more careful review. Third, an
understanding of which activities generally raise
salary levels can aid faculty members in optimally
allocating time and effort among competing time
demands and in making strategic career decisions.
Such information is too often lacking in mentoring
of graduate students and junior faculty. Finally,
higher education has suffered a steady decline in
share of public expenditures. University adminis-
trators routinely decry what they perceive as insuf-
ficient faculty lobbying to support higher educa-
tion generally, and claim that faculty salaries are
determined primarily by the fiscal health of the
higher education sector. Such claims are more
likely true in a competitive national market than in
one where universities exercise monopsony power
locally. 1
Previous Claims of Monopsony in the
Academic Labor Market
Several previous studies of the academic labor
market have found a negative maminal effect of
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seniority on faculty salary (Gordon et al., Hoffman,
Ransom). Like Barbezat and Donihue and Moore
et al., we find these results puzzling given that in
most studies of non-academic labor markets, se-
niority seems to be financially rewarding, whether
due to increased productivity, insurance motives,
or other factors (Hashimoto, Harris and Holm-
strom). Why should universities behave differently
with respect to their faculty?
Building on the growing literature concerning
monopsony in labor markets (Boal and Ransom),
Ransom posits a competitive national faculty labor
market pre-hire, but once a faculty member has
joined a particular university, spatial dispersion en-
dows universities with monopsony power over
their faculty, who face nontrivial moving costs if
they choose to leave for another institution. Thus,
new entrants to the academic labor market (i.e.,
new Ph.D,s or post-dots) and those with very low
moving costs are paid a market wage equal to the
professor’s marginal revenue product, but then (ex-
cept for those with very low moving costs) they
begin to be exploited as their universities take ad-
vantage of their moving costs to pay them system-
atically less. Black and Loewenstein (1991) offer a
model similar in spirit, in which new hires are
initially paid more than their marginal revenue
product as employers front-load salary schedules
in order to entice workers into exploitable rela-
tions. In either model’s equilibrium, this results in
a negative salary-seniority profile because those
with the highest moving costs—and thus those
subject to exploitation—move least often and are
paid the least. Ransom finds this negative senior-
ity-salary relationship in his oft-cited empirical
work on faculty salaries, controlling for standard
human capital variables (e.g., experience, gender,
race, academic discipline) and publications.
One concern about the Black/Loewenstein/
Ransom models is their implicit reliance on mov-
ing costs which may be implausibly large in order
to inhibit faculty from changing universities. While
individuals might face idiosyncratically high mov-
ing costs due to geographic preferences or family
circumstances, it is unlikely that this is a charac-
teristic of the full faculty population whose salaries
are estimated in the regressions. According to the
Statistical Abstract of the United States (1996),
there are better than 3,600 colleges and universities
in the United States, so the argument that spatial
dispersion creates significant (psychic or pecuni-
ary) moving costs has clear limits. Unless faculty
systematically fail to consider the future salary ef-
fects of changing their seniority, one would expect
faculty to compare the discounted net present value
of the compensation stream available from an al-
ternative potential employer with that from the in-Barrett and Bailey
cumbent university. Even using a conservative an-
nual discount rate of 10%, Ransom’s results imply
that switching research universities offers consid-
erable net present added value, as much as 78% of
annual salary over a ten year horizon for a faculty
member with ten years’ seniority.z We doubt such
large estimates accurately represent the central ten-
dency of frictions caused by moving costs in the
faculty labor market. This argument applies to sta-
tistically significantly positive seniority-salary re-
lationships as well; why would the average faculty
member forego substantial estimated earnings to
stay?3
The existence of a significant relationship be-
tween seniority and faculty salary might mask a
more intuitive relationship between faculty pro-
ductivity and salaries. Such would be the predic-
tion of a model in which faculty salaries are com-
petitively rather than monopsonistically deter-
mined. This relates to our third concern about the
conditioning variables used in the existing empiri-
cal literature on faculty salary determination, A
competitive markets model would suggest that the
salary earned by a professor would be wholly de-
termined by her productivity, by the salaries earned
by her peers at other institutions (i.e., the salaries
of her prospective substitutes), or both. Moore et
al. share our concern that the negative seniority-
salary profile presently accepted in the literature
may stem from the use of insufficiently compre-
hensive measures of faculty productivity. Taking
care to control for the quality of the journals in
which a sample of economics faculty publish, as
well as for the quantity of their publications, they
find that faculty with greater seniority are re-
warded less simply because, as a group, many have
been relatively less productive than their col-
leagues with less seniority at similar stages in their
careers. We likewise find that faculty productivity,
defined more broadly than just a count of publica-
tions, seems to lie behind the statistical relation
between salary and seniority found by others, as
manifest in the sharp drop in statistical significance
of the coefficient estimates on longevity variables
once one controls well for productivity.
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We have not found a study of faculty salary
determination that includes a market benchmark
among the regressors, But if faculty productivity is
difficult to observe and measure, as a bevy of re-
cent studies in higher education claim (CFAT,
1997), a reasonable and low-cost proxy university
employers might employ is the benchmark salary
for faculty of equal rank in the same discipline, i.e.,
the cost of a substitute hire.4 Omission of a bench-
mark salary implies either (a) that faculty marginal
value product can be readily observed, measured
and used to set salaries, (b) that the greater mar-
ketplace exerts zero influence over faculty salary
determination, i.e., that faculty salaries are locally
determined without reference to the broader mar-
ketplace, or both. Assumption (b) could bias re-
gression results in favor of supporting the monop-
sony hypothesis.
The Data
The data we use come from base salary informa-
tion on a twelve-month basis for 1995 on the 123
faculty with research appointments in both the
Utah Agricultural Experiment Station (UAES) and
academic departments at Utah State University
(USU), a land-grant university and a Carnegie I
Research University. The full suite of productivity
data were not available for the entire University
faculty, hence our restricted examination of faculty
affiliated with the UAES. Administrators and non-
tenure track appointments are excluded; only those
designated as professor, associate professor, or as-
sistant professor are considered, Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics on salaries by rank and gen-
der. Table 2 provides gender specific information
regarding age, experience, seniority, quality of ter-
minal degree granting institution, grant activity,
publications and teaching. Mean salaries for
women are less than men, but women also tend to
be younger, have fewer years of experience and
seniority, have won fewer grant dollars and have
Table 1. Average Salaries for Male and Female Faculty Members by Academic Rank
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Table 2. Personal Characteristic and Productivity Measures by Gender
Item Female Male
Mean Age 42.9 years 49,2 years
Mean Experience 10.5 years 18.7 years
Mean Seniority 8,1 years 16.0 years
Proportion of Terminal Degrees from Carnegie I Research Universities 82% 90%
Mean Dollars in Grants During the Study Period $16,228 $23,672
Mean No. of Type I Publications During the Study Period 10,1 10.7
Mean Teaching Evaluation 3,32 3.43
Mean Salary $53,789 $62,831
fewer publications and lower teaching evaluations
than their male counterparts.
This sample, while small, is likely biased in fa-
vor of finding the sorts of monopsony effects that
Ransom models. USU’S faculty are not organized
into a union. The nearest college is two counties
and fifty miles away, and the nearest Ph. D.-
granting, Carnegie Research University I is four
counties and ninety miles away. Professors cannot
easily switch university employers from USU
without relocating and entailing moving costs. The
University provides an unusually generous fringe
benefits package, including a 14.2% pension con-
tribution to TIAA-CREF. Moreover, a si nificant
!$ proportion of USU’S faculty are Mormons -exact
figures are unavailable for privacy reasons—who
place considerable psychic value on living in Utah,
a place of great cultural importance to members of
that church. Consequently, if faculty psychic and
pecuniary moving costs enable universities to ex-
ercise monopsony power locally over their facul-
ties, then surely such effects should appear in the
data from a place such as USU. This known bias
makes our results—which are inconsistent with the
claim that research faculty salaries are monop-
sonistically-determined—all the more interesting
and compensates somewhat for the modest sample
size involved.
The Regression Model
Our contribution to this line of research is that we
consider how both more detailed measures of pro-
ductivity and the broader academic labor market
might influence faculty salary levels. We proceed
in two steps. First we estimate models like those
used in previous studies (Barbezat and Donihue;
Gordon et al.; Hallock; Hoffman; Ransom), main-
taining the common exclusion of extramural salary
benchmarks from the regression specification. In
addition to measuring the effects of traditional de-
mographic variables (gender, race, seniority, and
experience) on faculty compensation, we also con-
trol for the faculty member receiving an outside
job offer, number of scholarly publications, teach-
ing evaluations, and faculty grant activity.
We assume that universities raid other campuses
in an attempt to poach highly productive faculty
members. In particular, anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that raids are often related not only to his-
torical research productivity and teaching effec-
tiveness, which would be captured in measures of
publications, teaching evaluations and grants won,
but also to a faculty member’s prospective admin-
istrative abilities, prominence in a field of growing
importance, or the extraordinary quality of the pro-
fessor’s research or teaching. While it is a crude
method, the existence of a recent outside offer may
convey information on faculty quality that is oth-
erwise unmeasurable.c
Research publications are the common currency
of academic productivity and we expect to find a
positive relationship between publication activity
and salaries. While we would like to control for
journal quality, as Moore et al. do in studying
economists’ salaries, this is essentially impossible
in a pool containing many distinct disciplines. One
would like to believe that universities care about
and reward teaching quality, although student
evaluations are a noisy indicator of a faculty mem-
ber’s performance in the classroom. Promotion of-
ten captures productivity attributes—e.g., publica-
tions quality, service, past productivity, profes-
sional reputation—otherwise omitted, so we
include rank (assistant, associate or full professor)
as an instrumented variable. We instrument for
rank because of potential endogeneity. Finally,
given the increasing financial dependence of re-
search universities on extramural contracts and
grants, we hypothesize that faculty compensation
is positively related to grantsmanship activity, a de
facto revenue-sharing arrangement between the
university and its principal investigators.
After augmenting the traditional human capital
earnings model with those more detailed measures
of faculty productivity, we subsequently introduceBarrett and Bailey Agricultural Experiment Station Faculty Salaries 5
national peer average salaries in order to test
whether the external benchmark for a particular
rank and discipline significantly affects individual
professors’ salaries. If faculty productivity were
perfectly observable, universities could readily
compute the employee’s marginal revenue product
and set salaries accordingly. But since the mea-
surement of faculty productivity is notoriously dif-
ficult, and since casual conversation with univer-
sity administrators suggests that they indeed pay
attention to market benchmark data, we explore
whether perhaps external benchmarks explain in-
dividual faculty salaries better than either human
capital or measurable productivity variables. Since
a strong positive correlation between individual
faculty salaries and the appropriate external bench-
mark could be evidence of either competitive or
monopsonistic limit pricing, we subsequently test
whether the deviation of salaries from external
benchmarks exhibits any patterns consistent with
one or the other explanation.
Following tradition, we define seniority in this
paper as the number of years the faculty member
has been employed by the university. Experience is
defined as the number of years since completion of
the terminal degree. We include detail on the num-
ber of refereed papers the faculty member pub-
lished, average teaching evaluations, and grant ac-
tivity, measured in thousands of dollars, all during
the most recent five-year period, as well as a
dummy variable to represent whether the faculty
member received an external competitive offer
during the preceding five years. The basic regres-
sion model is thus as follows:
(1) lnSi = (30+ ~lEXP, + ~2EXP~ + &SEN,
+ (34SEN; + ~5RANKi + ~6HWTt
+ 0,GRTi + 62sign (GRTi)GRT~
+ 030FFERi + 64PUBi
+ 05sign(PUBi)PUB~ + 06TCHi
+ 07sign(TCHi)*TCH~ + @~ACEi
+ 4fFEMi + ~j@jDpTV + ~i
where Si is the 1996 salary of the ith faculty mem-
ber, EXi is years of experience since the terminal
degree was awarded, and SEN is years of seniority
at the institution.
Because of prospective endogeneity, as identi-
fied by a Hausman test, we instrument for the vari-
able RANK using an ordered probit model with
assistant, associate, and full professors assigned a
value of O, 1, and 2, respectively.7 HWT is a
dummy variable equal to one if the faculty member
was hired with tenure and zero otherwise,8 OFFER
is a dummy variable taking unit value if the faculty
member received a competitive external offer in
the 199 1–1995 period, GRT is thousands of dollars
from grants awarded between 1991 and 1995 in-
clusive, measured as a deviation from the depart-
ment mean, PUB is the number of “Type I“ pub-
lications (this includes refereed journal articles,
books, and chapters in books) between 1991 and
1995 inclusive, again measured as a deviation from
the department mean,9 TCH is the deviation of the
professor’s average teaching evaluations over the
past five years from the department mean,10 DPT
are binary variables representing the ith faculty
member’s department, with the Department of So-
ciology, Social Work, and Anthropology as the
base, RACE is a binary variable equal to 1 for
non-Caucasians and O otherwise, FEM is 1 for fe-
males and O for males, and ~i is the iid, normal
disturbance term The squared terms for experience
and seniority are scaled by dividing by 100 while
those for grants, refereed publications, and teach-
ing evaluations are multiplied by the sign of the
deviation from the mean to capture universities’
likely asymmetric preference for above-average
performance, ]1
A White (1980) test revealed no significant het-
eroskedasticity, so we estimate the model using
ordinary least squares. Multicollinearity does not
seem an issue. The correlation matrix of the re-
gressors reveals that other than the intuitive col-
linearity of experience and seniority (r = 0.92)
omnipresent in this literature, no two regressors
have a correlation coefficient in excess of 0.32.
The single-log specification permits interpretation
of the parameter estimates as percentage marginal
effects.
The notation on the parameter estimates reveals
our strategy in researching this question. The ~
parameters relate to longevity variables (experi-
ence and seniority) on which the previous literature
has focused especially, the 0 parameters are asso-
ciated with indicators of productivity, and the @
parameters relate to demographic conditioning
variables beyond the faculty member’s control.
Previous studies (Moore et al, excluded) have ei-
ther omitted the 6 parameters or included only one
variable (publication quantities), entered linearly.
We are concerned that this omission leads to mis-
taken inference about the nature of the labor mar-
ket for research university faculty.
The productivity measures enter as deviations
from the faculty member’s department mean for
two reasons. First, it makes interpretation of the
results easy in the case of an “average” performing
faculty member. Second, the recent literature on
labor contracts emphasizes the role of tournaments
and the use of relative performance measures in
designing optimal multiagent incentive contracts6 April 1999
when employees’ effort is not observable, and thus
subject to moral hazard, as is the case with univer-
sity faculty (Lazear and Rosen; Bhattacharya and
Guasch). Since theory tells us tournaments are best
designed as cohort-specific, and because of unob-
servable heterogeneity between disciplines in
teaching, grantsmanship and publications stan-
dards, we use deviations from faculty member’s
department mean, rather than from the mean of the
full sample, to generate these relative measures of
faculty productivity.
The Role of Productivity in Determining
Faculty Salaries
We first estimate the model in equation (1) using
the specifications found in the previous literature
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on faculty salaries, omitting productivity indicators
and faculty rank and concentrating on what might
be termed the human capital earnings relationship.
Like Barbezat and Donihue, we find the traditional
increasing and concave salary-experience and sal-
ary-seniority profiles, with the returns to experi-
ence effectively nondecreasing over a career (the
peak is after 58 years) and the returns to seniority
peaking after ten years (table 3). As table 4 shows,
the p-values of joint statistical significance of
the linear and quadratic terms suggest that the ex-
perience (0.002) matters more than seniority
(0.132).
Once we introduce the range of faculty produc-
tivity variables (model 2), none of the coefficient
estimates on the longevity variables are statisti-
cally significantly different from zero, individually
Table 3. Returns to Longevity, Productivity and Market Benchmark Salaries
Parameter Estimates
Indep. Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Experience 0.021** 0.006 0.009 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.011) (0.01 1) (0.007) (0.009)




0.008 0.007 -0.016 -0.012 -0.014
(0.009) (0.017) (0.01 1)
Seniority*/ 100
(0.009) (0.01 1)
-0.038 -0.014 0.023 0.013 0.023
(0.024) (0.038) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)




0.058 0.044 -0.102 –0.114 -0.115
(0.071) (0.068) (0.073) (0.072) (0.073)
Rank 0.043
(0.096)




-2.32 X 10-’ 1.39x 10-8 6,1OX 10-7
(2.5 X 10-’) (2.0 x 10-’) (2.0 x 10-’)
Publications 0.006” 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Publications’ -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Teaching 0.113 0.080 0.053
(o. 112) (0.124) (0.124)






Hired With Tenure 0.046 -0.015 0.001
(0.068) (0.074) (0.074)
Ln (Peer Avg. Salary) (o.993t
(0.005)
Adjusted R* 0.467t o.527t o.441t 0.489~ 0.489t
The dependent variable in models 1–3 is the natural logarithm of annual salary on a twelve month basis, Models 1 and 2 rdso include
an intercept term and dummy variables for the faculty member’s department; model 3 includes only an intercept. The dependent
variable in models 4 and 5 is the difference between the natural logarithm of annual salary and the natural logarithm of peer national
average salmy, Those regressions include an unreported intercept term, All models estimated off 123 observations,
*Indicates statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level,
**Indicates statistically significantly different from zero at the 5~0 level.
tIndicates statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level.Barrett and Bailey Agricultural Experiment Station Faculty Salaries 7
Table 4. Joint Tests of Statistical Significance (p-values from asymptotic X2distributions)
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Experience 0.0016 0.8159 0.7315 0.7912 0,9676
Seniority 0,1318 0.9058 0.3059 0.1001 0.4182
Grants ($ 1000s) 0.1846 0.1989 0.1541
Publications 0.0417 0.8327 0.8225
Teaching 0.4230 0.8125 0.8835
All Other Than Ln(Peer Avera~e Salary) 0.0978
or jointly. 12The sharp increase in the p-values of
the hypothesis tests of joint (linear and quadratic)
statistical significance of the longevity variables,
from 0.002 to 0.816 for experience and from 0.132
to 0.906 for seniority, suggests that their increas-
ing, concave profile in model 1 largely reflects an
indirect relation through productivity variables,
rather than direct effects of faculty longevity. In-
deed, the key productivity measures—publica-
tions, grantsmanship and teaching—likewise ex-
hibit increasing concave effects on faculty salaries,
although the effect is jointly statistically significant
only in the case of publications (table 4), The
coefficients on two disciplinary dummy variables
were likewise statistically significant, in Biological
and Irrigation Engineering and Economics, at
19.1Yoand 18.1% premia over Sociology, Social
Work and Anthropology, respectively (table 5).
The point estimate on the OFFER and HWT vari-
ables have the correct sign but are of small mag-
nitude and statistically insignificant. The clear im-
plication is that the university rewards research
productivity as evinced by scholarly publications,
and little else matters. 13The coefficient estimates
on the gender and race variables are negative and
positive, respectively, but not statistically signifi-
cantly different from zero and of small magnitude.
Even omitting broader academic labor market
signals, this one, non-unionized university does not
seem to discriminate monopsonistically against its
research faculty despite an unusual opportunity to
do so afforded by its location, fringe benefits pack-
age, and the cultural characteristics of many of its
faculty. Controlling appropriately for faculty pro-
ductivity, it appears that faculty are compensated
primarily based on their productivity, a finding that
suggests the academic labor market is at least
workably competitive.
The Role of the Broader Academic Labor
Market in Determining Salaries
The foregoing analysis implies that to the extent
that research faculty salaries are set at the employ-
Table 5. Department Dummy Variable
Coefficient Estimates
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2
Agricultural Systems, Technology
& Education
Animal, Dairy & Veterinary Science






Family & Human Environments
Fisheries & Wildlife
Forest Resources
Nutrition & Food Science






















































Sociology, Social Work, and Anthropology is the default de-
partment against which comparisons are being made. The de-
pendent variable is the natural logarithm of annual salary on a
twelve month basis, Each model also includes an intercept term
and the variables reflected in table 3. All models estimated off
123 observations.
*Indicates statistically significantly different from zero at the
10% level.
**Indicates statistically significantly different from zerO at the
5% level.
~Indicates statistically significantly different from zero at the
1% level,
ing institution, research productivity is the primary
determinant of compensation, consistent with the
competitive markets condition that a worker’s
wage equal her marginal revenue product and the
widespread perception that research is the principal
task of faculty at research universities. But are fac-
ulty salaries really determined locally? While we
can introduce better measures of faculty produc-
tivity than the previous literature has—as the pre-8 April 1999 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
vious section and Moore et al. demonstrate—it is
nonetheless extraordinarily difficult for either an
econometrician or a university administrator to es-
tablish a faculty member’s true productivityy across
all assigned activities. Given imperfectly observ-
able productivity, many administrators may look to
external indicators of what similar faculty else-
where are paid.
To investigate this possibility, we introduce the
natural logarithm of national mean salary for fac-
ulty of the same rank and discipline (PEER), de-
rived from a 1995 survey of 93 institutions belong-
ing to the National Association of State Universi-
ties and Land Grant Colleges (NASULGC) that
also award doctoral degrees in at least five differ-
ent programs (reported in OSU). This is an appro-
priate peer group for research faculty at USU. This
external benchmark permits us to assess the degree
to which faculty salaries may be based on national
peer averages from the broader marketplace, a
question overlooked to date in the literature. While
the national average salaries are clearly external to
USU, the choice of individuals’ benchmark partly
depends on a faculty member’s rank, which we
previously found to be endogenous. So we again
ran a Hausman test for endogeneity, instrumenting
with the other regressors. We could not reject the
hypothesis that PEER was exogenous at any rea-
sonable level of statistical significance. 14
In table 3, model 3 we thus report estimates of
equation (1), absent the intercept, rank and depart-
ment dummy variables and including instead the
natural logarithm of the faculty member’s peer av-
erage salary (PEER). The results are striking.
There is nearly a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween peer salaries and USU faculty salaries, and
neither demographic nor productivity variables ex-
hibit any strongly statistically significant effect on
faculty salaries. Indeed, the joint null hypothesis
that the coefficients equal zero on all the regressors
except PEER is only just rejected at the ten percent
level (table 4). This specification also brings out
the effects of outside offers, which are now statis-
tically significant at the 11% level and estimated to
increase salary almost 15%. In these data, salaries
appear to respond directly and almost exclusively
to signals from the broader academic labor market.
Making the assumption that 3,600+ U.S. universi-
ties—or even the 93 NASULGC institutions in the
benchmark survey—cannot collude in setting fac-
ulty salaries, this is consistent with the hypothesis
of a competitive faculty labor market.
Since the findings of model 3 could also be con-
sistent with the university engaging in monop-
sonistic limit pricing of its research faculty—due
to market power afforded by (pecuniary or psy-
chic) moving costs, tenure, or both—we next ex-
plore whether either longevity or productivity vari-
ables explain the deviation or individual faculty
salaries from peer national averages. Replicating
models 1 and 2, now with percentage difference
between individual and national peer average sal-
ary as the dependent variable [ln(salary)-ln(peer
av. salary)], we find no systematic pattern to de-
viations, The longevity profiles are all now de-
creasing convex, with estimated minima at 10 and
46 years for experience and seniority, respectively.
Note in particular that seniority is jointly signifi-
cant at approximately the 10% level if one omits
productivity variables, but once these are intro-
duced, the p-value on the hypothesis test of joint
significance jumps to 0.418, suggesting that a
negative seniority-salary differential profile, akin
to that found by Ransom, is spurious. Productivity
variables continue to have a positive, concave re-
lationship to salary but none of the coefficient es-
timates are statistically significant. These regres-
sions explain roughly half the observed variation in
deviations from national peer average salaries, but
the high p-values associated with the coefficient
estimates suggests there is no clear pattern driving
these deviations. Given that these regressions are
equivalent to having imposed a unit coefficient,
instead of the 0.993 point estimate, on the ln(peer
average salary) variable in model 3, it is little sur-
prise that the coefficients on the regressors in mod-
els 4 and 5 are little changed from their point es-
timates or t-statistics in model 3, Apart from their
relation to the elicitation of competing outside of-
fers, deviations from market benchmark salary lev-
els appear to be largely random.
Conclusions
Contrary to some recent evidence in the literature
on faculty salaries and the academic labor market,
our results suggest that productivity and external
benchmarks provided by national peer average
salaries are the principal determinants of faculty
compensation and that one cannot reject the null
hypothesis of zero seniority effect on faculty sala-
ries. Keep in mind that these results come from a
nonunionized campus; the salary determination
process may well be different on the 30% or so of
American campuses on which faculty are repre-
sented by a collective bargaining agreement. Oth-
ers claim to find evidence that universities exercise
monopsonistic control over faculty. Using data
from research faculty affiliated with the agricul-
tural experiment station at one Carnegie Re-Barrett and Bailey Agricultural Experiment Station Faculty Salaries 9
search I University that should have uncommon
opportunity to exploit faculty members’ pecuniary
and psychic moving costs, if these are significant,
our results favor instead the hypothesis of a com-
petitive academic labor market.
Our results represent conditions among faculty
with research appointments at only one land-grant
university and the inferences we draw from these
results should clearly be checked using data from
other institutions. But these provisional results
nonetheless have interesting implications. The
finding that measures of research excellence are
important determinants of salary challenges the in-
creasingly popular cry that faculty salaries are un-
related to productivity. Our findings suggest that
calls for faculty unionization based on the percep-
tion that universities exercise monopsonistic power
in the academic labor market may be misinformed
or premature. Interuniversity faculty organization
to influence aggregate funding for higher educa-
tion, by contrast, is perhaps more advisable since
individual faculty salaries appear to be determined
largely in the national marketplace. There are,
however, formidable collective action problems in-
volved in organizing such a large and spatially dis-
persed group as university professors.
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1. This assumes the aggregate supply of faculty to
the national market is not perfectly elastic, but that
any single university perceives itself as facing per-
fectly elastic labor supply.
2. We assume universities are engaged in limit
pricing, setting wages equal to market wage less
moving costs.
3. For example, using a 1989 data set for faculty
salaries from the University of Massachusetts
(UMASS), Hallock finds a positive seniority-
salary relationship. Those estimates imply faculty
utility that is decreasing in income to justify any
faculty leaving UMASS and thereby not only in-
curring moving costs, but also forsaking the se-
niority premium Hallock seems to find. For in-
stance, the stylized faculty member with ten years’
seniority and an annual discount rate of 10% con-
sidered earlier would reap up to 549’o of annual
salary in net present value added over the next ten
years from staying at UMASS versus leaving for
another research university. We suspect faculty
unionization at UMASS largely explains the posi-
tive seniority-salary profile Hallock reports, since
Barbezat (1989) found that collective bargaining10 April f999 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
arrangements in higher education increase the re-
turns to seniority.
4. A reviewer rightly points out that total compen-
sation (i.e., salary plus fringe benefits) is a more
appropriate basis for comparison since fringe ben-
efits differ across institutions and may inhibit some
faculty from moving from their incumbent em-
ployers. Unfortunately, national data on total com-
pensation are not available at a sufficiently disag-
gregate level to offer the individual-level controls
needed in our regressions.
5. “Mormons” is a nickname commonly used to
refer to members of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints.
6. We should point out that while most of these
outside offers were (at least partially) matched by
the incumbent university in order to retain the fac-
ulty member, we are measuring whether an outside
offer was received and presented to the incumbent
employer by the faculty member, not whether it
was matched, either fully or partially.
7. Detailed results from the instrumenting equa-
tion are available from the authors.
8. We include this dummy variable because Hal-
lock claims that a statistically significantly positive
coefficient on it implies the exercise of market
power by the employer. However, he does not ex-
plain this claim, which has no support in labor
markets theory. It seems an imperfect control for
faculty quality, in the spirit of our OFFER variable,
with the important difference that HWT may cap-
ture quite dated information on a senior faculty
member hired with tenure decades earlier, while
the OFFER variable captures only more recent
market activity. The better indicator of the faculty
member’s current productivity is not whether she
was hired with tenure at some unknown prior date
but whether other universities currently bid for her.
We include HWT nonetheless in order to fully nest
Hallock’s specification within ours.
9. We initially treated sole- and jointly-authored
publications separately, but found they had basi-
cally the same impact on salary levels. Conse-
quently, they are combined here to conserve de-
mees of freedom, We also estimated this relation-
ship including non-refereed publications and
presentations as separate regressors to capture ser-
vice-oriented research publications. This had no
significant impact on salaries for any of the speci-
fications estimated, so we use only refereed pub-
lications as a proxy for all research publication.
Finally, we also included a dummy variable repre-
senting quality of the professor’s Ph.D.-granting
institution, but found this had no significant effect
in any specification, so we omit it here.
10. We also tried controlling for teaching load,
expressed both as number of courses and number
of students taught in the previous five years. The
regression results are qualitatively identical when
we supplement or substitute for teaching evalua-
tions with either teaching load measure. The de-
tailed results are available from the authors by re-
auest.
~1. We also ran these models using the more stan-
dard quadratic specification, with no qualitative
change in results.
12. It is worth notimz, moreover. that while the .,.
experience profile continues to be increasing over
an entire career (peaking after 75 years), the esti-
mated returns to seniority now peak at 25 years, a
substantial prolongation of the nonnegative effects
of institutional seniority.
13. The coefficient estimates in model 2 suggest
that a “star” (“superstar’’)-defined as a professor
with publications, grants and teaching evaluations
one (two) standard deviation(s) above the sample
mean and who has elicited an outside offer—earns
4.4 (7.2) % more than a colleague from the same
discipline with identical demographic characteris-
tics and mean performance across the board.
14. The qualitative results are anyhow unchanged
by using instrumental variables methods to obviate
any prospective endogeneit y of the PEER variable.
Details of the endogeneity test, the instrumenting
equation, and the instrumental variables estimates
are available from the authors.